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I. ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. This Court has recognized a narrow exception to the 
requirement that a non-party to litigation receive notice and an opportunity 
to be heard before an order is entered that may be applied to that non-party, 
limiting that exception to cases where the non-party is acting in concert 
with a party, or the party can only act through others (such as a union that 
can only act through its members). 
Can that narrow exception be extended to a non-party without any 
factual findings to support that extension, thus allowing courts to deprive 
online publishers of notice and the right to be heard before infringing their 
First Amendment rights by ordering them to remove online content? 
2. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(l) and (e)(3) prohibit courts from treating 
any "provider ... of an interactive computer service ... as the publisher or 
speaker of any information provided by another content provider," and, 
separately, from permitting a "cause of action [to] be brought" or "liability 
[to J be imposed" if it is "inconsistent with this section." 
Despite Section 230's statutory immunity, may a court enjoin a 
website publisher and require it to remove third-party created content from 
its website-and impose contempt citations and related liabilities that might 
flow from a failure to abide by such an injunction-merely because the 
plaintiff chose not to name the website publisher as a party in the litigation? 
II. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Yelp Inc. 1 learned for the first time that a prior restraint had been 
entered against it when a copy was delivered to its registered agent for 
service of process. A00537-547. The default Judgment that included that 
prior restraint required Yelp-a non-party to the underlying lawsuit-to 
remove reviews critical of Plaintiffs from its website and to not publish 
future postings from two Yelp accounts. A00213. Although Yelp had been 
given no advance notice that Plaintiffs were seeking a prior restraint against 
it, the trial court denied Yelp's motion to vacate the Judgment. A00808-
810. 
The court of appeal affirmed, invoking a nan-ow exception to basic 
due process rights that was created to prevent parties from evading an 
injunction through gamesmanship. Op. 18- I 9. On review, the appellate 
court did not find, or even consider whether, Yelp had engaged in such 
misconduct, and did not analyze Yelp's connections with the actual 
defendant. The appellate Opinion contemplates contempt and sanctions 
1 Along with Yelp's related websites and mobile applications, Non-
Party Appellant Yelp Inc. is referred to simply as "Yelp" in this Brief. 
Plaintiffs Dawn L. Hassell and the Hassell Law Group are referred 
to collectively as "Hassell" or "Plaintiffs." 
Citations to the three-volume Appendix filed in the court of appeal 
are denominated "AOOXXX." 
Citations to the appellate court's Memorandum Opinion are to "Op." 
Citations to the concurrently-filed Request for Judicial Notice are to 
the "RJN." 
2 
proceedings against Yelp if it refuses to comply, although Yelp has no 
more connection with the enjoined party than it has with the tens of 
millions of other third-patty authors whose reviews it hosts on Yelp, and 
engaged in no wrongful conduct. 
The court of appeal's due process analysis was flawed at virtually 
every step. Initially, the court misread U.S. Supreme Court authority that 
unequivocally requires notice and an opportunity to be heard in connection 
with orders restraining the distribution of speech. The appellate court held 
that no prior hearing was required. Op. 23. And while it may be true that 
in a narrow category of cases, courts may enjoin speech without a prior 
hearing, the law also is clear that a prompt hearing is constitutionally 
required to give the enjoined party an opportunity to oppose entry of an 
'//h'/1'1'.'/"" 
injunction against it. That did not happen here. Section jiV.A~, infra. 
/;'//////,".'/. 
To support its decision, the appellate court grossly expanded a 
narrow exception to due process, which gives courts leeway to apply 
injunctions to non-patties who-after the injunction is entered-are proven 
to have acted in collusion with the enjoined party, such as agents and 
abettors of that party. Without analyzing whether these cases should be 
extended to this very different factual scenario involving Internet speech, 
the court turned this exception into a general rule, which now allows courts 
to expressly name non-parties in injunctions without any factual findings of 
3 
misconduct. In doing so, the court rendered meaningless the careful 
guidelines California courts have adopted to limit the scope of this narrow 
exception, giving defamation litigants worldwide an incentive to forum 
shop in California and a roadmap to circumvent due process rights here. 
Section IV .B, infra. 
The court reached its conclusion only by pretending that Yelp is 
nothing more than the "administrator" of its website, ignoring Yelp's role 
as a publisher of third-party authored speech and its First Amendment right 
to control its own website. It also invoked this Court's decision in Balboa 
Island Village Inn, Inc. v. Lemen (2007) 40 Cal. 4th 1141 ("Balboa Island') 
to support the prior restraint it entered against Yelp, while ignoring the fact 
that in Balboa Island this Court narrowly approved an injunction entered 
against a party following a contested trial, and nowhere suggested that 
comis may permit injunctions against non-parties following default 
proceedings. None of the cases cited by the court of appeal support its 
rejection of Yelp's First Amendment rights here. Section IV.C, infi·a. 
The court of appeal combined its unwarranted rejection of Yelp's 
due process and First Amendment rights, with an unprecedented narrowing 
of the previously robust protection provided by the Communications 
Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230 ("Section 230"), to deny Yelp the federal 
immunity it would have received if Hassell had sued it. The court exalted 
the form of the action-namely, the fact that Yelp was tactically not named 
4 
as a party-over the plain language of Section 230 and Congress' clear 
intent in enacting it to protect websites from actions that treat them as 
publishers or distributors of third-party content. 
Section 230 immunity plays a vital role in the legal landscape that 
has allowed the Internet to flourish. As this Court noted a decade ago in its 
sole decision evaluating Section 230, "[t]he provisions of section 230(c)(l), 
conferring broad immunity on Internet intermediaries, are [] a strong 
demonstration of legislative commitment to the value of maintaining a free 
market for online expression." Barrett v. Rosenthal (2006) 40 Ca1.4th 33, 
56 ("Barrett"). In Barrett, this Court made clear that Section 230 
immunizes website operators from actions by disgruntled businesses hoping 
to punish them for allowing third-party content-even defamatory 
content-to remain on their websites. !d. at 39-40. Section V.A, infi·a. 
The court of appeal followed Barrett in name alone. Op. 27. Yelp 
established its right to Section 230 immunity by demonstrating that 
(!)Yelp is a "provider or user of an interactive computer service"; 
(2) Hassell seeks to treat Yelp as a "publisher or speaker" of the content at 
issue; and (3) the action is based on "information provided by another 
information content provider." 47 U.S. C.§ 230(c)(l). Courts across the 
country consistently have held that Section 230 protection precludes 
injunctive relief. E.g., Kathleen R. v. City of Livermore (2001) 87 
Cal.App.4th 684, 697-98 ("Kathleen R. "). The broad protection the United 
5 
States Congress intended when it enacted Section 230 protects Yelp here. 
Section V.B, irrfra. 
The appellate court rejected Yelp's Section 230 defense only by 
treating Yelp "as the publisher or speaker" ofthe information provided by 
Bird, contrary to the plain language of Section 230( c )(I). Specifically, the 
court affirmed an injunction imposed on Yelp by stretching due process law 
to conclude that Yelp was acting "with or for" Bird (Op. 30-31)-treating 
Yelp as standing in Bird's shoes solely based on Yelp's role as an online 
publisher of her alleged content. The court's misinterpretation of Section 
230 is utterly inconsistent with its due process holding-a contradiction 
that injects confusion into each of these legal principles. Its decision was 
flawed at every step, and must be reversed. Section V.C, inji·a. 
Viewed only through the prism of review websites such as Yelp, 
Section 230's broad protection ofwebsites that publish third-party content 
plainly serves the public interest. E.g., Edwards v. District of Columbia 
(D.C. Cir. 2014) 755 F.3d 996, 1006 ("[f]urther incentivizing a quality 
consumer experience are the numerous consumer review websites, like 
Yelp ... , which provide consumers a forum to rate the quality of their 
experiences"). If Yelp and entities like it are denied their right to exercise 
editorial control in publishing consumer reviews, this will provide 
businesses an effective tool to remove critical commentary and consumers 
will suffer. 
6 
But the appellate decision reaches far beyond this single area, vast 
though it may be. Internet publishers routinely display third-party content, 
including political organizations, media entities, and repositories of creative 
content such as YouTube, to name only a few. Some of this content 
entertains or educates, while some simultaneously offends, and much of it 
walks a line between protected and unprotected speech. The value of such 
content lies in the diversity and disparate views and opinions offered 
online. 
This does not leave plaintiffs like Hassell without a remedy-
although if it did it would not matter because Congress' intent controls. For 
twenty years, Congress has insisted that plaintiffs look to the content 
creator alone for a remedy, through tools such as judgment liens and 
contempt proceedings-post-judgment options that Hassell never pursued 
here. During those twenty years, no court has approved Hassell's stratagem 
of denying a website publisher its due process rights in order to tactically 
avoid the immunity Congress established through Section 230. The 
appellate court's blessing of the injunction entered against Yelp, following 
an uncontested hearing to prove up the default judgment against Bird alone 
(A00213), is a new loophole that this Court should close, lest future 
plaintiffs exploit it to escape Section 230's broad immunity. 
Ifthis Court were to affirm the appellate court's opinion, Yelp and 
other websites would suffer and the public that relies on the wealth of 
7 
online third-party commentary-to aid decision-making on myriad issues 
like consumer purchases, politics, and employment- would be harmed as 
subjects of criticism follow Hassell's example: intentionally sue the 
commenter alone, perhaps in a manner that maximizes the chance that he or 
she will be unable or unwilling to defend the lawsuit regardless of its 
underlying merit, and then after a default judgment present the injunction to 
the website publisher as an unassailable fait accompli. As the Amicus 
letters supporting review explained, people across the world are invoking 
the appellate decision to demand that website publishers remove content 
they do not like, or reconfigure their websites to hide that content. E.g., 
Amicus Letter of Google, Inc., dated August 10, 2016, at 3; Amicus Letter 
ofGlassdoor, Inc., dated August 15,2016, at 2. This case is only one of 
many different attempts to misuse the court system in the hope of stifling 
speech on the Internet. E.g., RJN Exs. A-C. The court of appeal's decision 
threatens to undermine the validity and efficacy of the information 
available to consumers, and online speech generally. Yelp respectfully 
requests that this Court reverse that decision. 
III. STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURE 
A. Yelp Publishes Tens of Millions of Third-Party Authored 
Reviews. 
Yelp allows any member of the public to read and write online 
reviews about local businesses, government services, and other entities. 
8 
A00240. Yelp is available to the public at no charge and without any 
registration requirement. I d. Those who register by creating an account 
may write reviews about businesses and service providers, and thus 
contribute to a growing body oftens of millions of publicly-available 
consumer reviews. I d. Tens of millions of other users read the reviews on 
Yelp when making a wide range of consumer and other decisions. I d. The 
businesses listed on Yelp also can create free accounts, which allow them 
to publicly respond to any review, with such a response appearing next to 
the original review. I d. Individuals posting reviews on Yelp can remove 
them at any time. A00841. As Yelp's website explains, it applies 
automated software to all reviews posted in an attempt to provide the most 
helpful reviews to consumers. A00519. 
B. Hassell Obtains An Injunction Against Yelp Without 
Giving It Any Notice. 
1. Third-Party Users Write Critical Reviews About 
Hassell Law Group On Yelp. 
Hassell, a San Francisco attorney, owns The Hassell Law Group, 
P.C. A00006. According to Hassell's Complaint, Bird suffered a personal 
injury on June 16, 2012, and retained The Hassell Law Group. A00002-3. 
After a few months, Hassell ended the attorney-client relationship. I d. On 
January 28, 2013 a user with the screen name "Birdzeye B." posted a one-
star review ofThe Hassell Law Group on Yelp, complaining that "dawn 
hassell made a bad situation much worse for me" and accusing Hassell of 
9 
failing to communicate with her and abandoning her as a client, among 
other things. A00018. Believing that "Birdzeye B." was Bird, Hassell sent 
Bird an email that day, requesting she remove the "factual inaccuracies and 
defamatory remarks" from Yelp. A00005. Bird replied the next day, 
complaining about Hassell's representation. A00348. 
2. Hassell Sues Bird And Obtains A Default 
Judgment, Which Includes An Injunction Against 
Yelp. 
On April 10,2013, Dawn Hassell individually, and the Hassell Law 
Group P.C., filed a complaint against Bird, but not Yelp, in San Francisco 
Superior Court. A00002. The suit asserted claims based on two allegedly 
defamatory reviews-one by Birdzeye B. and another by a reviewer 
identified as J.D. (A00004-5i-and sought compensatory and punitive 
damages. It also sought injunctive relief against Bird only. A00013. 
Although the Birdzeye B. public account profile stated that its creator lived 
in Los Angeles (A00091), Bird was served through substitute service on the 
owner of the Oakland home in which Bird was injured, who told the 
process server that he had not seen Bird in months. A00026. On July 11, 
2013, the court entered a default against Bird. A00023. 
2 The "J.D." review accused Hassell of improperly deducting costs 
from a settlement. A00020. Hassell claimed that "J.D." was Bird based on 
the review's use of capitalization, despite the content being at odds with the 
original challenged statement. A00034, A00099. 
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On November 1, 2013, Hassell filed a Summary of the Case in 
Support of Default Judgment and Request for Injunctive Relief. A00033-
36. Hassell significantly expanded the relief being sought as described in 
the Complaint, adding another allegedly defamatory statement to her claim 
(A00036, AOO 1 02i and demanding for the first time that the court "make 
an order compelling Defendant and Yelp to remove the defamatory 
statements, including all entire posts, immediately. If for any reason 
Defendant does not remove them all by the Court-ordered deadline (which 
is likely given Defendant's refusal to answer the complaint), the Court 
should order Yelp.com to remove al/3 ofthem." A00051 (emphasis in 
original). 
Plaintiffs' Request for Judgment went further, seeking "an Order 
ordering Yelp.com to remove the reviews and subsequent comments of the 
reviewer within 7 business days of the date of the court's Order." AOOOSl 
(emphasis added). Hassell intentionally did not serve her application for 
default judgment on Yelp or otherwise notify Yelp about it. A00243; see 
also A00837. The court granted the requested injunction, including the part 
ordering non-party Yelp to remove the existing comments and any 
"subsequent" comments posted by "Birdzeye B." or "J.D." A00213. The 
court made no factual findings as to Yelp. I d. 
3 She added another post from Birdzeye B. that accused Hassell of 
trying to "threaten, bully, intimidate, harrass [sic]" her into removing the 
reviews. A00036, A00102. 
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C. The Trial Court Denies Yelp's Motion To Vacate The 
Injunction. 
On January 28,2014, Yelp's registered agent for service of process 
received a letter enclosing a Notice of Entry of Judgment and threatening 
Yelp with contempt proceedings if it did not comply with the Judgment. 
A00537-547. On February 3, 2014, Yelp responded to Hassell by letter 
stating that as a non-party that did not receive notice or an opportunity to be 
heard, Yelp was not bound by the terms of the Judgment. A00548-550. 
Yelp further explained that Section 230 precludes enforcement of the prior 
restraint, or liability as to Yelp. A00549. Hassell did not respond until 
April30, 2014. She claimed that her office was "currently setting a motion 
to enforce the court's order against Yelp," but did not respond substantively 
to Yelp's position. A00551. 
On May 23, 2014, Yelp moved to vacate the Judgment. A00225-
470. Hassell opposed Yelp's Motion to Vacate. A00471-572. On 
September 29, 2014, the trial court denied Yelp's Motion. A00808. It 
quoted from Ross v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 899, 906 ("Ross"), 
and Berger v. Superior Court (1917) 175 Cal. 719, 721 ("Berger"), to hold 
that injunctions may run to non-parties who are aiding and abetting an 
enjoined person to violate an injunction, and concluded that Yelp fit within 
this exception to general due process requirements. A00808-809. It 
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implicitly rejected Yelp's claim to immunity under Section 230, not even 
referencing it in its order. Jd.4 
D. The Court Of Appeal Affirms The Trial Court's Decision. 
In a published decision, the court of appeal affirmed the trial court's 
conclusion that Yelp was bound by the prior restraint. Op. 1-2. As relevant 
here, the court characterized the portion of the Judgment requiring Yelp to 
remove content from its website as a "removal order" (A00212-213)-not 
an injunction (Op. !)-and without any explanation, treated the "removal 
order" as if it were separate from the Judgment. E.g., Op. 10-11 
(concluding that Yelp was not aggrieved by the default judgment, but was 
aggrieved by the removal order). 5 
4 During oral argument on Yelp's motion, the trial court expressed 
disbelief that the statute could mean what this Court, and uniform federal 
courts nationwide, have said it means. The trial court complained to Yelp's 
counsel that "(w]hat you're saying is you can post any kind of defamatory 
information for the world to see, and you can say, we don't have anything 
to do with it. We don't care if they say Ms. Hassell shot her mother, or 
something like that. It doesn't make any difference. I think your position 
is a very hard one to swallow." A00834:6-ll. While this Court expressed 
similar reservations about the statute, it followed Congress' directive and 
held that as a matter oflaw, websites like Yelp cannot be held liable for 
content posted by third parties, even if the content is defamatory. Barrett, 
40 Cal.4th at 62-63. 
5 Some of the court's holdings grew out of this novel 
characterization of the injunction against Yelp, and its Opinion ultimately 
turned on its conclusion that Yelp was not subject to an injunction at all. 
E.g., Op. 29 ("(a]gain though, the party that was enjoined from publishing 
content in this case was Bird, .... "). Title aside, the "removal order" is a 
classic injunction and the court of appeal plainly erred by treating it as 
anything else. See, e.g., PV Little Italy, LLC v. Metro Work Condominium 
Ass'n (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 132, 143 n.S (order returning control of 
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After evaluating Yelp's standing to appeal (issues not raised here), 
the appellate court rejected Yelp's argument that due process batTed 
enforcement of the injunction against it. Op. 18-23. The court noted, first, 
that "An Injunction Can Run Against a Nonparty." Op. 18. Citing a 
handful of cases, the court concluded that "settled principles undermine 
Yelp's theory that the trial court was without any authority to include a 
provision in the Bird judgment which ordered Yelp to effectuate the 
injunction against Bird by deleting her defamatory reviews." Op. 19. 
The appellate court did not discuss or apply any of the requirements 
that California courts have enunciated to justifY extending an injunction to 
a non-party. Op. I 9-21. Instead, it simply distinguished the cases Yelp 
cited, concluding that none presented facts similar to those presented here. 
!d. The court made clear that its decision did not turn on the facts of the 
case, and that the question of whether Yelp was "aiding and abetting" 
Bird's violation of the injunction "has no bearing on the question whether 
the trial court was without power to issue the removal order in the first 
instance." Op. 21. 
The court next rejected Yelp's argument that the First Amendment 
protects its right to distribute Bird's speech. Op. 21-23. The court 
association to non-parties was properly characterized as injunction); People 
v. Brewer (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 122, 135 (defining injunction "as a writ 
or order commanding a person either to perform or to refrain from 
performing a particular act" (citation omitted)). 
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distinguished a U.S. Supreme Court case holding that book and magazine 
distributors are entitled to due process in connection with a seizure order. 
Op. 21-22 (citing Marcus v. Search Warrants (1961) 367 U.S. 717 
("Marcus")). The court explained that "in this context, it appears to us that 
the removal order does not treat Yelp as a publisher ofBird's speech, but 
rather as the administrator of the forum that Bird utilized to publish her 
defamatory reviews." !d. The court provided no definition of its newly 
fashioned term "administrator of the forum." The court believed that the 
issue was whether a prior hearing was required, and that this case differs 
from Marcus because here "specific speech has already been found to be 
defamatory in a judicial proceeding." Op. 23. 
The court also rejected Yelp's argument that the injunction is an 
unconstitutional prior restraint. Op. 23-26. Expanding this Court's 
decision in Balboa Island to apply to non-party Yelp, the court held that 
"the trial court had the power to make the part of this order requiring Yelp 
to remove the [statements at issue] because the injunction prohibiting Bird 
from repeating those statements was issued following a determination at 
trial that those statements are defamatory." Op. 25. It narrowly reversed 
only that part of the trial court's order that barred publication of any 
comments by "Birdzeye B." or "J.D." that might be posted in the future. 
!d. 
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Finally, the court held that Section 230 did not protect Yelp from 
Hassell's injunction. Op. 26-31. Its decision turned largely on the fact that 
Hassell tactically chose not to sue Yelp, or even give it advance notice of 
her claims, which the court found "distinguish[ ed] the present case from 
Yelp's authority, all cases in which causes of action or lawsuits against 
internet service providers were dismissed pursuant to section 230." Op. 28 
(citations omitted); see also id. 29-30. The court reasoned that "[i]fan 
injunction is itself a form of liability, that liability was imposed on Bird, not 
Yelp." !d. 30-31. The court rejected each ofYelp's arguments. Op. 29-31. 
IV. INTERNET PUBLISHERS LIKE YELP ARE ENTITLED TO 
NOTICE AND AN OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD BEFORE THEY 
ARE ORDERED TO REMOVE CONTENT 
The injunction here names Yelp-although it is not a party to this 
action-and specifically orders Yelp to remove third-party authored content 
from its website. Invoking what it described as "settled principles" to reject 
Yelp's due process arguments, the court of appeal insisted that a non-party 
may be subject to an injunction if it might, at some point in the future, be 
held to have "act[ed) in concert with the enjoined party and in support of its 
claims." Op. 19 (citations omitted). 
But none of the cases the court cited touches on the issue presented 
here: whether a non-party to litigation has a right to challenge an order that 
expressly names it and affects its own rights-here, Yelp's right to maintain 
third-party authored reviews that are critical of others on its website, 
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sometimes in conflict with the desires of businesses that reject criticism and 
aim to remove such commentary from public view.6 And none allowed an 
injunction where the non-party has such a remote connection to the party 
enjoined. The only connection between Yelp and Bird is that Bird, like 
tens of millions of people, posts reviews on Yelp. The court's application 
of an exceedingly narrow exception to fundamental due process 
requirements grossly expands that exception beyond its intent and purpose 
and endangers protections for free speech online. 
A. Due Process Requires Notice And An Opportunity To Be 
Heard Before Being Subject To An Order Affecting 
Rights. 
The requirements of notice and hearing are firmly rooted in the 
United States and California Constitutions. As the court made clear in 
Estate of Buchman (1954) 123 Cal.App.2d 546, 559, "[t]he fundamental 
conception of a court of justice is condemnation only after notice and 
hearing." Thus, "[t]he power vested in a judge is to hear and determine, not 
to determine without hearing," and the Constitution requires a fair hearing. 
ld. at 560; see also People v. Ramirez (1979) 25 Ca1.3d 260,263-64. 
This Court long ago reaffirmed as a "seemingly self-evident 
proposition that a judgment in personam may not be entered against one not 
6 If Yelp removed every review a business owner argued was false 
or even defamatory, it would have few critical reviews on its website. Yelp 
resisted Plaintiffs' claims here to maintain the integrity of its website, for 
the benefit of its users. 
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a party to the action." Fazziv. Peters (1968) 68 Cal.2d 590, 591 ("Fazzi"). 
As the U.S. Supreme Court has held, courts "may not grant an enforcement 
order or injunction so broad as to make punishable the conduct of persons 
who act independently and whose rights have not been adjudged according 
to law." Regal Knitwear Co. v. NL.R.B. (1945) 324 U.S. 9, 13 ("Regal 
Knitwear"). That Court elsewhere explained that "it would violate the Due 
Process Clause ... to bind litigants to a judgment rendered in an earlier 
litigation to which they were not parties and in which they were not 
adequately represented." Richards v. Jefferson County (1996) 517 U.S. 
793, 794 (prior adjudication in tax case did not apply to petitioners because 
they were neither parties nor adequately represented in that case); see also 
Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found. (1971) 402 U.S. 313, 329 
("Some litigants-those who never appeared in a prior action-may not be 
collaterally estopped without litigating the issue. They have never had a 
chance to present their evidence and arguments on the claim. Due process 
prohibits estopping them despite one or more existing adjudications of the 
identical issue which stand squarely against their position."); Chase 
National Bankv. City of Norwalk, Ohio (1934) 291 U.S. 431, 440-441 
(reversing injunction entered against non-party; "[u]nless duly summoned 
to appear in a legal proceeding, a person not a privy may rest assured that a 
judgment recovered therein will not affect his legal rights"). 
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Despite these settled constitutional principles, Hassell intentionally 
sought to abrogate Yelp's due process rights when she moved for a default 
judgment; as she put it she "anticipated that Defendant Bird would refuse to 
remove the Yelp review." A00482. 7 The trial court agreed, enjoining 
speech that Yelp displays and-through automated software applying 
criteria developed for the benefit of consumers-may, in its discretion, use 
to provide an aggregate rating of the Hassell Law Group to consumers 
looking to hire lawyers. A00212-213, A00519. The appellate court 
approved this gambit, holding that Yelp was not entitled to notice. Op. 2, 
23. But because Yelp has a separate First Amendment right to distribute 
/.'""·/ 
the speech of others (Section lc;, infra), it was entitled to a hearing to 
o;,,. ..... ~ 
oppose entry of the overbroad injunction that restrained speech on its 
website. See Heller v. New York (1973) 413 U.S. 483, 489 ("Heller") 
("because only a judicial determination in an adversary proceeding ensures 
the necessary sensitivity to freedom of expression, only a procedure 
requiring a judicial determination suffices to impose a valid final restraint" 
(citations, internal quotes omitted; emphasis in original)).8 
7 Indeed, at the hearing on the motion to vacate, Hassell admitted 
that she did not name Yelp in her Complaint because Yelp is immune from 
suit under Section 230, although she also made a half-hearted (and 
incorrect) argument below that Yelp did not qualifY for Section 230 
immunity. A00837; compare footnote 19, infra. 
8 See also Carroll v. President & Commissioners of Princess Anne 
(1968) 393 U.S. 175, 180 ("there is no place within the area of basic 
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The court of appeal's invocation of Heller-which decided whether 
a party is entitled to an adversarial hearing before speech is seized-missed 
the point. Op. 23. Yelp did not receive any hearing; it had no opportunity 
to challenge the trial court's conclusion-reached in an uncontested 
hearing following a default judgment-that the speech at issue was 
defamatory and must be removed, and that Yelp must not allow future 
speech to be posted by Bird. The appellate court plainly erred in failing to 
recognize the "seemingly self-evident proposition" (Fazzi, 68 Cal.2d at 
591) that Yelp was denied its due process right to notice and a hearing 
before the injunction was entered against it, and in narrowly reversing only 
the part of the injunction that barred future speech. Op. 25. As shown 
below, the line of cases it invoked does not support the broad abandonment 
of due process that occurred here. Section B, infra. 
freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment" for ex parte orders "where 
no showing is made that it is impossible to serve or to notify the opposing 
parties and to give them an opportunity to participate"); Lee Art Theatre, 
Inc. v. Virginia (1968) 392 U.S. 636, 637 (reversing conviction based on 
public display of movie alleged to be obscene; seizure warrant "fell short of 
constitutional requirements demanding necessary sensitivity to freedom of 
expression" (citations omitted)); A Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas 
(1964) 378 U.S. 205,212-213 ("if seizure ofbooks precedes an adversary 
determination of their obscenity, there is danger of abridgment of the right 
of the public in a free society to unobstructed circulation ofnonobscene 
books" (citations omitted)); Kash Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles 
(1977) 19 Cal.3d 294,309 (ordinance allowing seizure of news racks 
without prior notice violated the First Amendment; "the Constitution does 
require that any such summary seizure procedure be narrowly drafted so as 
to minimize interference with First Amendment rights"). 
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B. The Court Of Appeal Diminished Fundamental Due 
Process Protections By Expanding A Narrow Rule 
Allowing Courts To Enjoin Aiders, Abettors, And Agents 
Of Parties. 
In rejecting Yelp's due process arguments, the court of appeal 
invoked what it characterized as "settled principles" of law that in limited 
circumstances allow an injunction to "run to classes of persons with or 
through whom the enjoined party may act." Op. 19. This narrow exception 
to the general due process requirement of notice and an opportunity to be 
heard allows an injunction to be enforced against a non-party who is not 
named in the injunction based on evidence establishing that the enjoined 
party and the non-party acted together to evade the injunction, or the 
enjoined party and non-party have a close relationship such as union and 
member. Op. 19-21. The appellate court held that these cases authorized 
an injunction that expressly applies to Yelp, without any factual findings or 
evidence that Yelp engaged in the type of conduct, or had the type of 
relationship with the enjoined party, that California courts consistently have 
required. ld. 
In Regal Knitwear, 324 U.S. at 14, the U.S. Supreme Court 
explained the very narrow purpose of this exception-that successors and 
assigns may be bound by an injunction if they are "instrumentalities 
through which defendant seeks to evade an order or [) come within the 
description of persons in active concert or participation with them in the 
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violation of an injunction." The Supreme Court did not decide if the non-
parties there could be held liable for violating the injunction, although it 
cautioned that it "depends on an appraisal of his relations and behavior and 
not upon mere construction of terms of the order." !d. at 15; see also In re 
Lennon (1897) 166 U.S. 548, 554-555 (injunction against railroad company 
could be enforced against one of its employees). As Judge Learned Hand 
explained nearly a century ago, a court is "is not vested with sovereign 
powers to declare conduct unlawful; its jurisdiction is limited to those over 
whom it gets personal service, and who therefore can have their day in 
court." A/emile Mfg. Corp. v. Staff(2d Cir. 1930) 42 F.2d 832, 832-833. 
The court emphasized that "[t]his means that the respondent must either 
abet the defendant, or must be legally identified with him." Id. (emphasis 
added). 
One California court has explained that this "common practice" of 
"mak[ing] the injunction run also to classes of persons through whom the 
enjoined party may act" means that "enjoined parties may not play 
jurisdictional shell games; they may not nullifY an injunctive decree by 
carrying out prohibited acts with or through nonparties to the original 
proceeding." People v. Kothari (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 759,766-767 
(reversing injunction against property owners that also would bind all 
future owners of the property) (citations omitted; emphasis added). The 
court elaborated that courts may extend injunctions only to 
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"'instrumentalities through which [the] defendant seeks to evade an order 
or ... persons in active concert or participation with them in the violation of 
an injunction."' ld. at 770 (citation omitted; emphasis added). Thus, this 
rule allows courts to enjoin third parties who are acting at the behest and for 
the benefit of the third party, and not in pursuit of their own rights. 
Yelp is aware of only one case presenting similar facts, and that 
court rejected the argument Hassell makes here. Blockowicz v. Williams 
(N.D. Ill. 2009) 675 F.Supp.2d 912, aff'd (7th Cir. 2010) 630 F.3d 563. 
There, the court refused to enforce an injunction as to a non-party website 
hosting defamatory content, explaining that the website operator's "only 
act, entering into a contract with the defendants, occurred long before the 
injunction was issued. Since the injunction was issued, [the website 
operator] has simply done nothing, and it has certainly not actively assisted 
the defendants in violating the injunction." I d. at 916. 
In contrast, none of the cases the court of appeal invoked to support 
its holding enforced an injunction against a non-party on facts anything like 
those here. Op. 19. In most, the court refused to enforce an injunction 
against a non-party, finding that the relationship with the party was not 
close enough to justify the attempt, or remanding for further consideration 
of the evidence against the non-party. Berger, 175 Cal. at 719-720 
(injunction against union and members could not be enforced against non-
union member); Planned Parenthood Golden Gate v. Garibaldi (2003) 107 
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Cal.App.4th 345, 353 (refusing to enforce injunction against abortion 
protestors neither named individually nor as class members); People v. 
Conrad (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 896, 903-904 (injunction against anti-
abortion group could not be applied to separate group); In re Berry (1968) 
68 Cal.2d 137, 155-156 (reversing injunction related to union activity 
because it enjoined persons acting "in concert among themselves"). 
The court of appeal cited only one decision affirming enforcement of 
an injunction against a non-party. Op. 19 (citing Ross, 19 Cal.3 d at 905).9 
In Ross, this Court held that an injunction against a state agency could be 
enforced against county agencies that served as agents in administering the 
program at issue. But that holding turned on the relationship between the 
state and county agencies. ld. at 907-908. The Court explained that 
because the state agency "could comply with the provisions of the ... order 
... only through the actions of county welfare departments, it is clear that 
such counties could not disobey the order with impunity." Jd. at 909. Here, 
in contrast, Bird herself could comply with the injunction at any time by 
removing the review from Yelp; no cooperation by Yelp is required to 
effectuate the injunction against Bird. A00841. And needless to say, Yelp 
is not Bird's agent. 
9 In addition, the court separately rejected Yelp's reliance on People 
ex rei. Gallo v. Acuna (1997) 14 Ca1.4th 1090, 1125, in which this Court 
affirmed a gang injunction against non-parties because "the gang itself, 
acting through its membership, (] was responsible for creating and 
maintaining the public nuisance" at issue. 
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The couti of appeal's opinion skews this line of cases, drastically 
expanding them beyond their original intent, in three fundamental ways. 
First, in none of the cases cited-and indeed, no case known to Yelp-did 
the court approve an injunction that required a specifically-named non-
party to act, or not act, as ordered. Each evaluated application of an 
injunction to a non-party not explicitly named. E.g., In re Berry, 68 Cal.2d 
at 155-156 (strikers, who were not members of enjoined union); Planned 
Parenthood, 107 Cal.App.4th at 350-351 (abortion protestors). In 
explicitly directing the injunction to Yelp, the court treated Yelp as if it had 
been a party and present in the case all along with full opportunity to stand 
up for its rights as a publisher, ignoring the reality that Hassell intentionally 
did not sue Yelp and prevented Yelp from learning about the application for 
the injunction in the first place. The appellate court's decision does not 
even mention that the court was applying these cases to a completely 
different set of facts, or contemplate the implications of its decision to do 
so. Its perfunctory analysis led to the wrong result. 
Second, the court made clear that it did not base its decision on any 
conduct by Yelp, explaining that the question of whether Yelp aided and 
abetted Bird's alleged violation of the injunction was "potentially 
improper" and "has no bearing on the question whether the trial court was 
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without power to issue the [injunction] in the first instance." Op. 21. 10 
Thus, the court affirmed the injunction against Yelp without any evidence 
that Yelp engaged in the type of conduct that courts-including this 
Court-consistently require to justifY applying an injunction to a non-party 
allegedly colluding with the enjoined party. Op. 19; e.g., Regal Knitwear, 
324 U.S. at 16 (a decision to enjoin a specific party as a successor or assign 
would require "a judicial hearing, in which their operation could be 
determined on a concrete set of facts"); see also id. at 15 ("whether a 
nonparty is bound 'depends on an appraisal of his relations and 
behavior"'). 11 Here, there was no appraisal ofYelp's behavior or conduct 
10 The appellate court contemplated a second hearing, at which the 
trial court would decide whether Yelp should be held in contempt. Op. 18. 
But Yelp is faced with an injunction that expressly enjoins it and should not 
have to decide between complying with an unconstitutional prior restraint 
and risking contempt sanctions. The procedure the court of appeal 
endorses-entering an injunction without notice and asking later ifthe 
injunction is proper, all while entertaining contempt enforcement-is not 
and cannot be the law in California. Cf In re Berry, 68 Cal.2d at 148-149 
(person affected by injunction may seek "a judicial declaration as to its 
jurisdictional validity" or violate the order and risk contempt sanctions). 
Under the court's rationale, no reason exists to give anyone advance notice 
that an injunction is being sought against them. Op. 21. The enjoined party 
could just argue afterwards-in opposing contempt proceedings-that no 
facts support the injunction. But that is not, and should not be, the law in 
California. 
11 Accord Lake Shore Asset Mgmt. Ltd. v. Commodity Futures 
Trading Comm 'n (7th Cir. 2007) 511 F.3d 762, 767 (whether injunction can 
be applied to non-party "is a decision that may be made only after the 
person in question is given notice and an opportunity to be heard'' 
(emphasis added)). 
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before Yelp was explicitly named in the injunction and later threatened 
with contempt proceedings. A00211. 
No prior case has gone so far. Moreover, the court reached its 
decision without any analysis or appreciation of how its unfettered 
expansion ofthis formerly narrow exception to due process will affect 
websites like Yelp, which publish tens of millions of third-party 
submissions, but which have no other relationships with those third 
parties-much less connections that justify being treated as their agents. If 
this narrow exception can be applied to Yelp-which is connected to Bird 
only because she is one of millions of people who post on Yelp-it can be 
applied to any third party. The exception will have swallowed the rule. A 
newspaper that refuses to remove a published letter to the editor or a quote 
fi·om a source in an article, a bookstore that continues to sell a book found 
to be misleading, and a library that provides Internet access, all are non-
parties "with or through whom [an] enjoined party may act." But none has 
the type of close relationship with the enjoined party that courts 
consistently have required to hold them bound by an injunction to which 
they were not a party. 
Tlrird, the court ignored Yelp's interests in its own website-
permitting California courts to view a non-party's conduct solely through 
the lens of a plaintiffs unopposed characterizations of the defendant's 
alleged conduct, without regard to the separate interests of the non-party 
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(here Yelp, a publisher) in the conduct or speech being enjoined. The court 
rejected the cases Yelp cited solely because they involved money 
judgments. Op. 20-21 (citing Fazzi, 68 Cal.2d 590; Tokio Marine & Fire 
Ins. Corp. v. W. Pac. Roofing Corp. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 110). The 
appellate court did not explain why Yelp should receive less protection 
against a prior restraint-which this Court has described as "one of the 
most extraordinary remedies known to our jurisprudence [which] carr[ies] a 
heavy burden against constitutional validity" (People v. Lucas (20 14) 60 
Cal.4th 153,261, disapproved on other grounds, People v. Romero (2015) 
62 Cal. 4th 1; citation omitted)-than it would against a mere money 
judgment. As discussed below, independently, Yelp's First Amendment 
right to control the content of its website easily transcends the other 
interests that have been held to be worthy of the protections of the Due 
Process clause. See Section C, inji·a. 
C. Yelp Has A First Amendment Right To Publish Reviews 
On Its Website. 
In affirming the trial court's decision, the court of appeal declared 
without analysis or supporting legal authority that the injunction "does not 
treat Yelp as a publisher ofBird's speech, but rather as the administrator of 
the forum that Bird utilized to publish her defamatory reviews." Op. 22. 
The appellate court's faulty reasoning ignores Yelp's important role as an 
online publisher and its strong interest in developing and maintaining a 
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trusted resource that provides helpfbl consumer reviews to the public, 
including critical reviews that dissatisfied clients post. 
To support its ovetTeach, the court purported to distinguish Marcus 
and Heller, but it overlooked the fundamental point of these and the many 
other cases that protect the right to distribute speech. Op. 22-23. The U.S. 
Supreme Court has recognized a First Amendment right to distribute 
speech, separate from the right to make the speech in the first instance, 
which cannot be infringed without notice and an opportunity to be heard. 
See, e.g., Marcus, 367 U.S. at 731-732 (wholesale distributor of books and 
magazines had right to prompt hearing in connection with seized materials); 
Heller, 413 U.S. at 489-490 (seizure without a prior hearing is permissible 
only if adequate procedural safeguards are followed). 
Yelp and other online forums like it are not merely the 
"administrators" of their websites, whatever the court of appeal meant by 
this undefined term. They are publishers and editors whose actions to 
disseminate speech are fully protected by the First Amendment and due 
process rights. E.g., Bigelow v. Virginia (1975) 421 U.S. 809, 822 
(newspaper entitled to protection of First Amendment in publishing birth 
control advertisement, in part because of the public interest in the 
information at issue); Arkansas Educational Television v. Forbes (1998) 
523 U.S. 666, 674 ("[w]hen a public broadcaster exercises editorial 
discretion in the selection and presentation of its programming, it engages 
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in speech activity ... Although programming decisions often involve the 
compilation of the speech of third parties, the decisions nonetheless 
constitute communicative acts" (citations omitted)); see also footnote 8, 
supra. 12 Yelp, for example, has developed automated software designed to 
enhance users' experiences by showcasing more helpful content over 
potentially less helpful content (like paid-for reviews). E.g., A00519. And 
Yelp maintains terms of service and content guidelines that, when violated, 
can lead to the removal of offending content. A0056 I. The third-party 
authored reviews that Yelp hosts also serve as the basis for the aggregate 
Yelp star rating that each business receives, depending on the criteria 
developed by Yelp and applied through its automated software. A00519. 
The fiction adopted by the court of appeal-inventing a role it 
coined "administrator of the forum," which apparently has none of the 
constitutional protections granted to publishers-to brush aside Yelp's clear 
interest in the integrity of its website was unprecedented and led to the 
wrong result here. The appellate court invoked Balboa Island to support its 
decision but this too was an unwarranted expansion of existing law. As the 
U.S. Supreme Court explained in Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart: 
12 Even the U.S. Supreme Court's landmark decision in New York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964) 376 U.S. 254, involved third-party speech-
there, an "advertorial" published by the New York Times titled "Heed Their 
Rising Voices," soliciting funds to defend the Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr. 
against an Alabama perjury indictment, among other things. !d. at 256-257. 
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[P]rior restraints on speech and publication are the most 
serious and the least tolerable infringement on First 
Amendment rights. A criminal penalty or a judgment in a 
defamation case is subject to the whole panoply of protections 
afforded by defening the impact of the judgment until all 
avenues of appellate review have been exhausted. Only after 
judgment has become final, conect or otherwise, does the 
law's sanction become fully operative. 
A prior restraint, by contrast and by definition, has an 
immediate and irreversible sanction. If it can be said that a 
threat of criminal or civil sanctions after publication "chills" 
speech, prior restraint "freezes" it at least for the time. 
(1976) 427 u.s. 539, 559. 
Similarly, in Wilson v. Superior Court (1975) 13 Cal.3d 652, 660, 
this Court rejected a prior restraint that prohibited further publication of a 
political candidate's newsletter criticizing his opponent. I d. at 662. The 
Court explained that "if publication of the Pentagon Papers did not 
constitute a sufficiently serious threat to justify creation of an exception to 
the established principles [against prior restraints] set forth above, the 
circulation of election campaign charges, even if deemed extravagant or 
misleading, does not present a danger of sufficient magnitude to warrant a 
prior restraint." I d. at 660; see also Hurvitz v. Hoejjlin (2000) 84 
Cai.App.4th 1232, 1241 (order baning release of private, embarrassing, 
information is prior restraint and presumptively unconstitutional); Evans v. 
Evans (2008) 162 Cai.App.4th 1157, 1167 ("[p ]rior restraints are highly 
disfavored and presumptively violate the First Amendment" (citation 
omitted)); Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. Los Angeles 
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Times Comm 'n LLC (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 808, 821-824 (affirming order 
striking complaint seeking prior restraint). 
As this Court intentionally made clear in Balboa Island, because 
prior restraints are disfavored, they can be entered, if at all, only following 
a process that fully protects the rights of the party sought to be enjoined. 40 
Ca1.4th at 1155-1156. "'An order issued in the area of First Amendment 
rights must be couched in the narrowest terms that will accomplish the pin-
pointed objective permitted by constitutional mandate and the essential 
needs of the public order. In this sensitive field, the State may not employ 
'means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can 
be more narrowly achieved.' . . . In other words, the order must be tailored 
as precisely as possible to the exact needs ofthe case." Jd. at 1159 (quoting 
Princess Anne, 393 U.S. at 183-184). In Balboa Island, the Court approved 
an order enjoining the repetition of a statement found to be defamatory at a 
contested trial, although it also found part to be invalid because it applied 
to the defendant and "all other persons in active concert and participation 
with her," but no evidence in the record supported a finding that anyone 
else made defamatory statements. I d. at 1158, 1160. 
Here, unlike in Balboa Island, the court approved a prior restraint 
(i) against a non-party that had no notice or opportunity to oppose the prior 
restraint (ii) following a default judgment, not a contested trial, (iii) based 
on an Order that did not evaluate any of the individual statements to 
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determine if they are false, defamatory, and unprivileged. A00211. Cf 
Barrett, 40 Cal. 4th at 57 ("[ d]efamation law is complex, requiring 
consideration of multiple factors"). Balboa Island does not support the 
prior restraint entered against Yelp here, nor should it be expanded beyond 
its unique application. 
Neither this Court nor the U.S. Supreme Court has allowed a prior 
restraint on speech to stand-even against threats to national security-
unless the enjoined party received the full panoply of protections required 
by the U.S. and California Constitutions. The appellate court's decision 
approving a prior restraint here, based on nothing more than an uncontested 
default proceeding following no notice to Yelp and questionable notice to 
defendant (A00026) flies in the face of the federal and state decisions that 
have uniformly concluded that prior restraints on speech are among the 
most egregious and least defensible orders that can be entered by a court. 
None of the appellate court's reasons for affirming the prior restraint 
entered against Yelp withstand scrutiny. Its Opinion should be reversed 
and the trial court should be directed to enter an order granting Yelp the 
relief it sought-vacating the Judgment to the extent that it ordered Yelp to 
take any action on the content it publishes on its website. A00237-238. 
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V. SECTION 230 BARS THE INJUNCTION AGAINST YELP 
BASED ON COMMENTS POSTED BY "BIRDZEYE B." AND "J.D." 
The Internet has effected one of the greatest expansions of free 
speech and communications in history. It is "a tool for bringing together 
the small contributions of millions of people and making them matter."13 
Today, nearly 3.5 billion people use the Internet, submitting and viewing 
hundreds of millions of posts, comments, photos, videos and other content 
every day. 14 As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, "the content on the Internet 
is as diverse as human thought." Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union 
(1997) 521 U.S. 844,852 (citation omitted). 
This is no accident. In 1996, to promote the free flow of infonnation 
on the Internet, Congress resolved to protect websites and other online 
providers from liability for their users' content. Section 230 embodies that 
command, prohibiting courts from treating such a provider as the 
"publisher or speaker" of third-party content. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). 
13 Lev Grossman, You-Yes, You-Are TIME's Person of the Year, 
TIME MAGAZINE (Dec. 25, 2006). 
14 
"Internet Users," Internet Live Stats, available at 
http://www.internetlivestats.com/internet-users/ (visited October 31, 2016); 
see also Mary Madden and Kathryn Zickuhr, 65% of online adults use 
social networking sites (Aug. 26, 2011), available at 
http://pewinternet.org/Reports/2011/Social-Networking-Sites.aspx (as of 
2011, 65% of online adults used social networking sites); Josh James, How 
Much Data Is Created Eve1y Minute? (June 8, 2012), available at 
http://www. domo. com/b I og/20 12/06/how-much-data-is-created -every-
minute/?dkw=socf3. 
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Grounded in core First Amendment principles, Section 230 offers strong 
protection for innovation and expansion of free speech on the Internet. 
A. Section 230 Protects Online Publishers From All Legal 
Actions Based On Third-Party Content. 
Section 230 was adopted to "preserve the vibrant and competitive 
free market that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive 
computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation," and to 
"encourage the development ofteclmologies which maximize user control 
over what information is received by individuals, families, and schools who 
use the Internet." 47 U.S.C. §§ 230(b)(2), (3). To achieve these and other 
goals, Congress barred any claims against website publishers based on the 
publication ofthird-prirty content-i.e., content not created by the website 
operator itself, but contributed by an array of authors, photographers, and 
others that provide a diversity of expression that extends far beyond the 
resources of any one single online publisher. Section 230 sets forth a 
straightforward principle: If someone authors injurious content, a plaintiff 
can pursue the author of that content, but not the entity that" displays it on 
the Internet. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1); see generally Carafano v. 
Metrosplash.com Inc. (9th Cir. 2003) 339 FJd 1119, 1124 ("Carafano") 
(protecting website where "the selection of the content was left exclusively 
to the user"). 
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This Court recognized that purpose in its only decision interpreting 
Section 230, Barrett v. Rosenthal, holding that Section 230 "precludes 
courts from entertaining claims that would place a computer service 
provider in a publisher's role. Thus, lawsuits seeking to hold a service 
provider liable for its exercise of a publisher's traditional editorial 
functions-such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or 
alter content-are barred." 40 Cal.4th at 43-44 (citing Zeran v. America 
Online, Inc. (4th Cir. 1997) 129 F.3d 327, 330 ("Zeran")). The Court 
invoked "the congressional finding that the Internet has flourished 'with a 
minimum of government regulation'(§ 230(a)(4)), and the policy statement 
favoring a free market for interactive computer services 'urifettered by 
Federal or State regulation'(§ 230(b)(2))" to support its decision rejecting 
liability there. Id. at 44 (citing Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330-331; emphasis 
added). The Court reiterated that "Congress 'made a policy choice ... not to 
deter harmful online speech [by] imposing tort liability on companies that 
serve as intermediaries for other parties' potentially injurious messages."' 
I d. 
As this Court discussed in Barrett, Section 230 grew out of cases 
early in the life of the Internet that attempted to adapt common law tort 
liability principles to Internet publishers. 40 Cal.4th at 44. In 1995, "a 
service provider was held liable for defamat01y comments posted on one of 
its bulletin boards, based on a finding that the provider had adopted the role 
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of 'publisher' by actively screening and editing postings." !d. (citing 
Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co. (N.Y. Sup. 1995) 1995 WL 
323710, at *4). The Court explained that, "' [f]earing that the specter of 
liability would ... deter service providers from blocking and screening 
offensive material, Congress enacted § 230's broad immunity,' which 
'forbids the imposition of publisher liability on a service provider for the 
exercise of its editorial and self-regulatory functions."' !d. (citing Zeran, 
129 F.3d at 331). 
Indeed, Congress left few doubts about its intentions. The 
legislative history expressly stated that Congress intended to overrule 
Stratton Oakmont "and any other similar decisions which have treated such 
providers and users as publishers or speakers of content that is not their 
own because they have restricted access to objectionable material." See 
S. Conf. Rep. No. 104-230 (1996) (emphasis added). 
To accomplish its broad goals, Section 230 provides that "[n]o 
provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the 
publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information 
content provider," and it separately preempts any state law, including 
imposition of tort liability that is inconsistent with its protections. 47 
U.S.C. §§ 230(c)(1) & (e)(3). Courts reviewing Section 230's legislative 
history have found that it has two primary goals. 
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First, "Section 230 was enacted, in part, to maintain the robust 
nature oflnternet communication and, accordingly, to keep government 
interference in the medium to a minimum." Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331. 
Second, Congress designed Section 230 to "encourage service 
providers to self-regulate the dissemination of offensive material over their 
services .... In line with this purpose,§ 230 forbids the imposition of 
publisher liability on a service provider for the exercise of its editorial and 
self-regulatory functions." !d. (emphasis added); accord Carafano, 339 
F.3d at 1122-23; Batzel v. Smith (9th Cir. 2003) 333 F.3d 1018, 1027-28 
('Batzel"). 
To further these two complimentary policy goals, "courts have 
treated§ 230(c) immunity as quite robust," Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1123, 
and federal courts consistently have rejected attempts to hold defendants 
responsible for third-party content posted on their websites. 15 As the Ninth 
Circuit explained, "close cases ... must be resolved in favor of immunity, 
15 See, e.g., Doe v. Backpage.com, LLC (1st Cir. 2016) 817 F.3d 12, 
22; Universal Commc'n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc. (1st Cir. 2007) 478 FJd 
413,.419; Ricci v. Teamsters UnionLocal456 (2d Cir. 2015) 781 F.3d 25, 
28; Green v. America Online, Inc. (3d Cir. 2003) 318 F.3d 465, 470-72; 
Zeran, !29 F .3d at 330-32; Doe v. MySpace, Inc. (5th Cir. 2008) 528 F.3d 
413, 418; Jones v. Dirty World Entm 'I Recordings LLC (6th Cir. 2014) 755 
F.3d 398, 408; Chicago Lawyers' Comm.for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. 
v. Craigslisl, Inc. (7th Cir. 2008) 519 F.3d 666, 671 ("Chicago Lawyers"); 
Johnson v. Arden (8th Cir. 2010) 614 F.3d 785, 792; Carafano, 339 F.3d at 
1125; Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1031-32; Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co. v. America 
Online Inc. (lOth Cir. 2000) 206 F.3d 980, 984-86 ("Ben Ezra"); Almeida v. 
Amazon. com, Inc. (11th Cir. 2006) 456 F.3d 1316, 1321; Klayman v. 
Zuckerberg (D.C. Cir. 2014) 753 F.3d 1354, 1358. 
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lest we cut the heart out of section 230 by forcing websites to face death by 
ten thousand duck-bites, fighting off claims that they promoted or 
encouraged-or at least tacitly assented to-the illegality of third parties." 
Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates. Com, LLC (9th 
Cir. 2008) 521 F.3d 1157, 1174 (en bane). 
In each of these decisions, the appellate court properly focused on 
the author of the content-rather than the distributor-no matter how 
offensive or objectionable the content might be. This is because "Congress 
made a policy choice ... not to deter harmful online speech through the 
separate route of imposing tort liability on companies that serve as 
intermediaries for other parties' potentially injurious messages." Zeran, 
129 F .3d at 330; see also Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs. Com, 
Inc. (4th Cir. 2009) 591 F.3d 250, 254-255 (Section 230 "immunity 
protects websites not only from ultimate liability, but also from having to 
fight costly and protracted legal battles" (citations, internal quotes 
omitted)); accord Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1031. 
In Barrett, relying heavily on federal decisions such as Zeran, this 
Court broadly construed the federal statute to reject both the appellate 
court's distinction between publishers and distributors for purposes of 
Section 230 immunity, and the notice-based liability urged by the plaintiff 
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there. 16 The Court explained that "(b]ecause the probable effects of 
distributor liability on the vigor ofinternet speech and on service provider 
self-regulation are directly contrary to § 230's statutory purposes, we will 
not assume that Congress intended to leave liability upon notice intact." I d. 
at 46 (citing Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333). The Court agreed with cases that 
followed Zeran, explaining that "Congress contemplated self-regulation, 
rather than regulation compelled at the sword point of tort liability." Jd. at 
46-47, 53. 17 The Court agreed with the concern noted in Zeran that 
"[n]otice-based liability for service providers would allow complaining 
parties to impose substantial burdens on the freedom oflnternet speech by 
lodging complaints whenever they were displeased by an online posting," 
explaining that "[t]he volume and range oflnternet communications make 
the 'heckler's veto' a real threat under the Court of Appeal's holding." I d. 
at 57-58 (citations omitted). 
Those same problems would find new life in California if this Court 
approved the no-notice injunction that the appellate court allowed here. 
16 This Court was reviewing the court of appeal's holding that ISPs 
and users "are exposed to liability if they republish a statement with notice 
of its defamatory character." 42 Cal. 4th at 39. 
17 The Court supported its decision, in part, by the U.S. Congress's 
express approval ofthe broad interpretation of Section 230(c) in cases such 
as Zeran, Ben Ezra and Doe v. America Online (Fla. 2001) 783 So.2d 1010. 
Barrett, 40 Cal. 4th at 54 & n.l7 (citations omitted). In extending the reach 
of Section 230 in 2002, Congress stated that "[t]he Committee intends these 
interpretations of section 230(c) to be equally applicable to those entities 
covered by" the new law. !d. (citation omitted). 
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That is why, in this Court's words, the statute is so broad as to provide 
"blanket immunity for those who intentionally redistribute defamatory 
statements on the internet." Barrett, 40 Ca1.4th at 62-63. It does so "to 
protect online freedom of expression and to encourage self-regulation, as 
Congress intended." !d. at 63. 
B. Yelp Established Its Right To Section 230 Immunity. 
As discussed above, under Section 230, "[n]o provider or user of an 
interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of 
any information provided by another information content provider," and 
separately "any state law, including imposition of tort liability, that is 
inconsistent with its protections," is preempted. 47 U.S.C. §§ 230(c)(l) & 
(e)(3) (emphasis added). The statute defines "interactive computer service" 
as "any information service, system, or access software provider that 
provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer 
server," 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2), and "Internet content provider" as "any 
person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or 
development of information provided through the Internet or any other 
interactive computer service." !d. § 230(f)(3). An "access software 
provider" is "a provider of ... enabling tools that ... pick, choose, analyze 
or digest content; or transmit, receive, display, forward, cache, search, 
subset, organize, reorganize, or translate content." !d. § 230(f)(4). 
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Thus, while a plaintiff may pursue remedies against the creator of 
allegedly unlawful online content, that plaintiff may not pursue claims of 
any form against website publishers who are (1) a "provider or user of an 
interactive computer service"; (2) where plaintiff seeks to treat the website 
publisher as a "publisher or speaker"; and (3) the action is based on 
"information provided by another information content provider." 47 U.S.C. 
§ 230(c)(1); see Gentry v. eBay, Inc. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 816, 830. 
Section 230 bars the injunction against Yelp, as well as any liability 
for failing to comply with the injunction. First, Yelp qualifies as a provider 
of"an interactive computer service" because it operates a website. 
Universal Commc 'n Sys., 478 F.3d at 419 ("web site operators ... are 
providers of interactive computer services within the meaning of Section 
230"); Batzel, 333 FJd at 1030 n.16. 
Second (addressing the third requirement for the statute to apply), 
"Birdzeye B." and "J.D."-the users who posted comments on Yelp-are 
"information content providers" because they are wholly responsible for the 
creation of the content ofthe comments. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(£)(3). 18 
18 See also, e.g., Doe II v. MySpace Inc. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 561, 
572-73 (web site, as publisher of third-party content, had immunity, and 
decision "to restrict or make available certain material is expressly covered 
by section 230"); Hupp v. Freedom Commc'ns, Inc. (2013) 221 
Cal.App.4th 398, 400, 405 (Section 230 barred a lawsuit where the plaintiff 
alleged a newspaper "breached its user agreement with [plaintiff] by failing 
to remove comments made on their website concerning" him where the 
comments were written and posted by third parties); Delfino v. Agilent 
42 
Hassell has never alleged, and cannot, that Yelp played any role in the 
authorship ofBirdzeye B. or J.D.'s comments. 19 
Third-and the key issue before this Court-the injunction against 
Yelp treats it as a publisher or speaker. As the Fourth Circuit explained in 
Zeran, "[p ]ublication does not only describe the choice by an author to 
include certain information. In addition, both the negligent communication 
of a defamatory statement and the failure to remove such a statement when 
first communicated by another party-each alleged by Zeran here under a 
negligence label-constitute publication." 129 F.3d at 332 (citations 
Techs., Inc. (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 790, 807-08 (Section 230 immunity 
applied to claims brought by recipients oflnternet threats against the 
transmitter of threats and his employer, whose computer system he used); 
Shiamili v. Real Estate Group of New York, Inc. (N.Y. 2011) 17 N.Y.3d 
281, 285, 293 (website that "promoted" a user's allegedly defamatory 
comment to a stand-alone post accompanied by an insulting illustration and 
some content remained immune from suit under Section 230; the "added 
headings and illustration do not materially contribute to the defamatory 
nature of the third-party statements"). 
19 In the briefing below, Hassell conceded that Yelp is a provider of 
interactive computer services, and that she is seeking to treat Yelp as the 
publisher or speaker of information provided by readers. A00486:27-
A00488:13. She argued that Yelp should not be immune because it "is 
actively participating in promoting the defamation of Plaintiffs." 
A00486: 19-20. While Hassell did not analyze the provisions of Section 
230 or rely on any case law, she seemed to be articulating an argument that 
Yelp was an "information content provider," and was therefore not shielded 
from liability. The statute defines an information content provider as any 
party "responsible ... in part" for the "creation or development of 
infonnation." 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3). The court of appeal did not adopt this 
argument in its Opinion, concluding instead that Section 230 does not apply 
because the injunction does not impose any liability on Yelp. Op. 28. 
Because Plaintiff did not seek this Court's review of the appellate court's 
implicit rejection of these arguments, Yelp will not address them. 
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omitted). So too here. As discussed below, in concluding otherwise, the 
court of appeal misread Section 230, drastically altering its application in 
California. Section C, infi·a. 
C. The Appellate Court's Interpretation Ignores And 
Misconstrues Key Parts Of Section 230. 
In holding that Section 230 does not protect Yelp, the appellate court 
invoked the unique procedural posture of this case-the result of Hassell's 
tactical decision to deny Yelp the opportunity to defend itself-explaining 
that "[n]either patty cite[ d] any authority that applies section 230 to restrict 
a court from directing an Internet service provider to comply with a 
judgment which enjoins the originator of defamatory statements posted on 
the service provider's Web site." Op. 28. This circular reasoning only 
rewards Hassell's disdain for due process. It ignores the fact that to obtain 
a remedy against Yelp-the injunction that the appellate court approved-
Hassell was required to state a claim against Yelp. Here, the defamation 
claim that Hassell asserted in an attempt to obtain that relief was not 
alleged against Yelp, but regardless, the resulting order against Yelp is 
barred by Section 230's plain language. Hassell's claims must be rejected 
because they contravene the mandate of Section 230 that "[n]o provider or 
user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as [a] publisher or 
speaker .... " 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(l). 
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As this Court explained in Barrett, the Court "cannot construe the 
statute so as to render [language] inoperative." 42 Cal.4th at 59 (citing 
Duncan v. Walker (2001) 533 U.S. 167, 174; Hassan v. Mercy American 
River Hospital (2003) 31 Cal.4th 709, 715-716). There, the Court rejected 
plaintiffs reading of Section 230 because it "fails to account for the 
statutory provision at the center of our inquiry: the prohibition in section 
230(c)(l) against treating any 'user' as 'the publisher or speaker of any 
information provided by another information content provider."' !d. at 60. 
The Court summarized: 
Section 230 has been interpreted literally. It does Jtot permit 
Internet service providers or users to be sued ffS 
'distributors,' nor does it expose 'active users' to liability. 
Plaintiffs are free under section 23 0 to pursue the originator 
of a defamatory Internet publication. Any further expansion 
ofliability must await congressional action. 
Id. at 63 (emphasis added). See also, e.g., Chicago Lawyers, 519 F.3d at 
671 (reading Subsection (c)(1) literally to bar claims under Fair Housing 
Act because "only in a capacity as publisher could Craigslist be liable"); 
Dart v. Craigslist, Inc. (N.D. Ill. 2009) 665 F.Supp.2d 961, 969 (rejecting 
claims against Craigslist based on allegedly illegal adult advertisements 
because complaint's allegations "plainly treat Craigslist as the publisher or 
speaker ofinfonnation created by its users"). "Plaintiffs who contend they 
were defamed in an Internet posting may only seek recovery ji-om the 
original source of the statement" (Barrett, 40 Ca1.4th at 40 (emphasis 
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added)), because "Congress has decided that the parties to be punished and 
deterred are not the internet service providers but rather are those who 
created and posted the illegal material" (MA. ex rel. P.K. v. Village Voice 
Media Holdings, LLC (B.D. Mo. 2011) 809 F.Supp.2d 1041, 1055). 
Before the court of appeal rejected Section 230's application in this 
case, California courts were in accord. "If by imposing liability ... we 
ultimately hold eBay responsible for content originating from other parties, 
we would be treating it as the publisher, viz., the original communicator, 
contrary to Congress's expressed intent ... " Gentry, 99 Cal.App.4th at 831 
(citations omitted); see also Doe II, 175 Cal.App.4th at 563, 572-573 
("appellants want MySpace to regulate what appears on its Web site" and 
"[t]hat type of activity-to restrict or make available certain material-is 
expressly covered by section 230"); Delfino, 145 Cal.App.4th at 807 
(rejecting claims against website publisher that "treated it 'as the publisher 
or speaker' (§ 230(c)( 1)) of Moore's messages" (citations omitted)). 20 
20 Accord Murawski v. Pataki (S.D.N.Y. 2007) 514 F.Supp.2d 577, 
591 ("Deciding whether or not to remove content or deciding when to 
remove content falls squarely within Ask. com's exercise of a publisher's 
traditional rule and is therefore subject to the CD A's broad immunity" 
(citations omitted)); Backpage.com, LLC v. Cooper (M.D. Tenn. 20 13) 939 
F.Supp.2d 805, 828-829 (CDA preempted state law that "conflicts with 
Congress's intent in enacting CDA section 230 because it imposes liability 
on websites acting as publishers of third-party information and creates a 
regime that will likely restrict speech and undermine self-policing that 
already occurs online"). 
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The Ninth Circuit's analysis of Section 230 in Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc. 
(9th Cir. 2009) 570 F .3d 1096 is instructive. There, the court affirmed 
dismissal of claims for negligent undertaking based on allegations that 
defendant failed to abide by its promise to remove allegedly illicit content. 
!d. at 1103, 1106. Rejecting plaintiffs argument that her claims did not 
seek to hold defendant liable for publication, but instead for failing to 
perform its alleged undertaking, the court explained that "what matters is 
whether the cause of action inherently requires the court to treat the 
defendant as the 'publisher or speaker' of content provided by another." !d. 
at 1101-02. Analyzing what a publisher does, the court explained that "one 
does not merely undertake; one undertakes to do something." !d. at 1103 
(emphasis in original). Thus, "the duty that [plaintiff] claims [defendant] 
violated derives from [defendant's] conduct as a publisher-the steps it 
allegedly took, but later supposedly abandoned, to de-publish the offensive 
profiles. It is because such conduct is publishing conduct that we have 
insisted that section 230 protectsji·om liability 'any activity that can be 
boiled down to deciding whether to exclude material that third parties seek 
to post online."' !d. at II 03 (citing Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1170-71; 
emphasis added). The Court emphasized that "Subsection ( c )(I), by itself, 
shields from liability all publication decisions, whether to edit, to remove, 
or to post, with respect to content generated entirely by third parties." !d. at 
1105 (emphasis added). 
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Here, the court of appeal drastically departed from these rulings by 
misreading subsection (e)(3) of Section 230 and treating it as a limitation 
on the broad immunity established by subsection (c)(1). The court held that 
Section 230 did not apply to the prior restraint it imposed on Yelp "because 
[the court did] not impose any liability on Yelp, either as a speaker or a 
publisher of third-party speech." Op. 29. But Yelp is named in the 
injunction only for its role as publisher of the third-party reviews at issue, a 
straightforward contradiction of subsection (c)(l)'s prohibition on treating 
Yelp as the speaker or publisher of third-party content on its website. 
Subsection (e)(3) does not limit the broad immunity provided by subsection 
(c)( I), as the court of appeal implicitly held. It merely affirms the ability of 
state courts to entertain state law claims that are "consistent" with Section 
230, while making clear that "inconsistent" state law claims and liability 
are barred.21 The court of appeal's misreading of subsection (e)(3) renders 
subsection (c)(!) meaningless. Barrett, 42 Cal.4th at 59. The court of 
appeal's decision to treat subsection (e)(3) as establishing the scope of 
immunity undermines the broad protection that Congress intended for 
online publishers like Yelp. 
21 Further illustrating the court of appeal's misreading, if section (e) 
encapsulated Section 230 immunity, then Section 230 would not bar federal 
civil claims. Plainly, that is not the case. E.g., Roommates. com, 521 F.3d 
at 1170-71 (Section 230 applied to claims under Fair Housing Act); 
Chicago Lawyers, 519 FJd at 672 (same); Sikhs for Justice "SFJ", Inc. v. 
Facebook, Inc. (N.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2015) 144 F.SuppJd 1088 (Section 230 
barred federal and state claims). 
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The court's conclusion that "[i}f an injunction is itself a fonn of 
liability, that liability was imposed on Bird, not Yelp" (Op. 30)-relying on 
the fiction that the injunction against Yelp was not actually an injunction 
against Yelp (see footnote 5, supra)-exposes another fundamental flaw in 
its decision. The court of appeal reached its result only by violating 
subsection (c)(l) and treating Yelp as if it was the author (or "speaker") of 
the reviews at issue. It held that Yelp could be enjoined, without notice or 
an opportunity to be heard, under a limited legal principle that allows coutts 
to extend injunctions to non-parties who act on behalf of parties in violating 
the injunction. The court concluded that Yelp was acting "with or for" Bird 
as the publisher of the statements at issue. Op. 30-31 (citing Conrad, 55 
Cal.App.4th at 903); see Section IV.B, supra. This is, at its core, treating 
Yelp as if it, rather than simply Bird, published the allegedly defamatory 
content. The court's due process and Section 230 holdings are 
fundamentally at odds with each other, resulting in a confusing and 
contradictory interpretation of each of these legal principles. 
The appellate court also etTed in concluding that Section 230 does 
not apply to requests for injunctive relief. Op. 28. The court held that the 
injunction "does not violate section 230 because it does not impose any 
liability on Yelp," elaborating that "Hassell filed their complaint against 
Bird, not Yelp; obtained a default judgment against Bird, not Yelp; and was 
awarded damages and injunctive relief against Bird, not Yelp." !d. Thus, it 
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held that the liability that would flow out of contempt proceedings if Yelp 
fails to abide by the injunction is not within the scope of Section 230 
immunity. But this explanation-key to the ultimate decision-is simply 
incorrect. The relief that Hassell obtained against Yelp can only be 
characterized as an injunction based on Yelp's activities as a publisher. See 
footnote 5, supra. 
Courts across the nation consistently have concluded that Section 
230 bars injunctive relief, as well as tort and contract liability. As one court 
explained, "[a]n action to force a website to remove content on the sole 
basis that the content is defamatory is necessarily treating the website as a 
publisher, and is therefore inconsistent with section 230." Medytox 
Solutions, Inc. v. Investorshub.com, Inc. (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014) 152 
So.3d 727, 729, 730-731 (rejecting action for declaratory and injunctive 
relief based on Section 230). 
In the only California case to address the issue, Kathleen R., 87 
Cal.App.4th at 697-698, the court held that section 230(c)(1) protected a 
city from claims based on public access to the Internet at a public library, 
which included a request for injunctive relief. The court explained that "by 
its plain language,§ 230[(c)(1)] creates a federal immunity to any cause of 
action that would make service providers liable for information originating 
with a third-party user of the service." !d. at 692, 697-698 (citation, 
internal quotes omitted; bracketed citation in original). Noting that "claims 
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for ... injunctive relief are no less causes of action than tort claims for 
damages," the court held that they also "fall squarely within the section 
230(e)(3) prohibition." !d. at 698. Plaintiffs equitable claims there 
"contravene[d] section 230's stated purpose of promoting unfettered 
development of the Internet no less than her damage claims." !d. 22 
As the court explained in Noah v. AOL Time Warner (E.D. Va. 
2003) 261 F.Supp.2d 532, 538-39, aff'd (4th Cir. Mar. 24, 2004) 2004 WL 
602711, "given that the purpose of§ 230 is to shield service providers from 
legal responsibility for the statements of third parties, § 230 should not be 
read to permit claims that request only injunctive relief. After all, in some 
circumstances injunctive relief will be at least as burdensome to the service 
provider as damages, and is typically more intrusive." !d. at 540; see id. at 
538-39 (in seeking to hold defendant liable for refusing to intervene to stop 
22 See also Ben Ezra, 206 F.3d at 983, 986 (Section 230 barred 
claims for damages and injunctive relief); Hinton v. Amazon. com.dedc, 
LLC (S.D. Miss. 2014) 72 F.Supp.3d 685, 687, 692 (claims seeking 
injunctive relief and damages based on allegedly selling recalled hunting 
equipment barred by Section 230); Dart v. Craigs/ist, Inc. (N.D. Ill. 2009) 
665 F.Supp.2d 96!, 963, 969 (rejecting public nuisance claim, including 
request for injunctive relief); Smith v. Intercosmos Media Group (E.D. La. 
2002) 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24251,2002 WL 31844907, *13-14 
(rejecting injunction claim against ISP based on alleged failure to block 
purportedly fictitious domain registrants (citing Kathleen R., 87 
Cal.App.4th at 697-698)); Giordano v. Romeo (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) 76 
So.3 d 1100, 1102 (rejecting claims for defamation and injunctive relief); 
Shiamili, 17 N.Y.3d at 285, 293 (rejecting defamation claim based on a 
blog post, seeking damages and injunctive relief); Reit v. Yelp! (N.Y. Supr. 
2010) 907 N.Y.S.2d 411, 415 (rejecting request for preliminary injunction, 
and granting Yelp's motion to dismiss complaint). 
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alleged online harassment and requesting "an injunction requiring 
[defendant] to adopt 'affirmative measures' to stop such harassment," 
plaintiff"clearly" is attempting "to 'place' [defendant] 'in a publisher's 
role,' in violation of§ 230" (citing Zeran, !29 F.3d at 330)).23 
Hassell admitted below that there is "vibrant, extensive national 
jurisprudence on section 230." Respondents' Appeal Brief("R.A.B.") at 
43. Yet, Hassell did not cite a single case to support her proposition that 
the CDA allows interactive computer services to be subject to injunctions 
to remove third-party content so long as they are not named in an action. 
Courts across the Nation consistently have rejected liability for the mere 
hosting of defamatory speech authored by third parties-which is not 
surprising, given that Section 230(c)(l) flatly prohibits such a result. 
Plaintiffs also typically satisfy the basic due process requirements that 
should have protected Yelp here. In the end, Hassell's demand for 
23 Yelp is aware of only two cases to suggest otherwise-both in 
dicta without any analysis. In Mainstream Loudoun v. Board of Trustees of 
Loudoun (E.D. Va. 1998) 2 F.Supp.2d 783, the court held that Section 
230(c)(2)-a separate subsection not at issue in this case-does not protect 
government entities. !d. at 790. In dicta, the court said that even if it did, 
"defendants cite no authority to suggest that the 'tort-based' immunity to 
'civil liability' described by§ 230 would bar the instant action, which is for 
declaratory and injunctive relief." !d. (citing§ 230(a)(2); Zeran, 129 F.3d 
at 330). As the court in Kathleen R. later pointed out, Mainstream Loudoun 
is distinguishable because subsection (c)(2) contains limiting language that 
is not applicable to subsection 230(c)(l). 87 Cal.App.4th at 697-698. In 
Does v. Franco Prods. (N.D. Ill. June 22, 2000) 2000 WL 816779, *5, the 
court merely cited Mainstream Loudoun to state in dicta that "Plaintiffs' 
claims for injunctive relief, although not precluded by the CDA, fail to state 
a claim." 
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injunctive relief against Yelp fails because it is entirely based on Hassell's 
claim that Yelp published defamatory speech, but Section 230 bars all such 
claims. 
Nor is it relevant that many cases applying Section 230 to 
defamation claims involve "allegations of defamatory conduct by a third 
party, and not a judicial determination that defamatory statements had, in 
fact, been made by such third party on the Internet service provider's 
website." Op. 30. This case was able to proceed to a default judgment only 
because one ofHassell's targets-the one that had the financial 
wherewithal to defend against her demand for an injunction-was 
purposefully not named as a party or served with process in the case, and 
therefore could not prevent a result that is plainly barred by Section 230. 
Under basic due process principles, Yelp is not bound by a finding that 
defendant's statements are defamatory because it was not party to the 
proceedings that gave rise to that finding. Section IV.A, supra. In any 
event, the court's reasoning ignores the language of the CDA, which 
assumes that the statements are actually defamatory, but provides immunity 
regardless. See Barrett, 40 Cal. 4th at 39-40. This is a distinction without a 
difference, which only serves to inject confusion and ambiguity into 
Section 23 0 jurisprudence. 
Finally, the court of appeal's conclusion that Section 230(e)(3)'s 
reference to "liability" does not extend to contempt sanctions also must be 
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flatly rejected. Op. 31. Section 230(e)(3) prohibits both liability and 
"cause[s] of action" against website publishers like Yelp, to protect them 
"from having to fight costly and protracted legal battles." Roommates, 521 
F.3d at 1174-75. See also Nemet Chevrolet, 591 F.3d at 254-55 (Section 
230 provides an "immunity from suit," not merely a "defense to liability"). 
This goal plainly is not served by a ruling that permits prior restraints to be 
entered against website publishers like Yelp without any advance notice or 
opportunity to be heard. Section IV.C, supra. 
But even if Section 230(e)(3) only barred liability, the appellate 
court still would be wrong because it ignored the plain meaning of 
"liability"-"legal responsibility to another or to society, enforceable by 
civil remedy or criminal punishment." Liability, Black's Law Dictionary 
(lOth ed. 2014). See also Noah, 261 F.Supp.2d at 540 (injunctive relief"is 
typically more intrusive" than damage awards). Indeed, American courts 
long have recognized the uniquely pernicious dangers of prior restraints on 
speech. See Section IV.C, supra. The appellate court's conclusion that 
prior restraints are allowed where liability is barred turns the First 
Amendment on its head. 
The Ninth Circuit recently again rejected gamesmanship that 
attempts to circumvent Section 230. Kimzey v. Yelp! Inc. (9th Cir., Sep. 2, 
2016) 836 F.3d 1263,2016 U.S. LEXIS 16665. There, the court rebuffed 
plaintiffs attempts "to plead around the CDA," "declin[ing] to open the 
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door to such artful skirting of the CD A's safe harbor provision," "given 
congressional recognition that the Internet serves as a 'forum for a true 
diversity of ... myriad avenues for intellectual activity' and 'ha[s] 
flourished ... with a minimum of government regulation."' Id at *4 
(citations omitted). As the Court explained, "[i]t cannot be the case that the 
CDA and its purpose of promoting the 'free exchange of information and 
ideas over the Internet' could be so casually eviscerated." Id at * 11 (citing 
Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1122). 
Affirming the appellate court's decision, in contrast, would 
embolden the kind of abuse that already is happening across the country at 
the behest of businesses determined to scrub critical reviews from websites 
like Yelp's. For example, a reputation management company hired by a 
Georgia dentist unhappy with a negative review fi-audulently obtained a 
judgment and injunction in Maryland, which was then presented to Yelp 
with a request that Yelp remove the review. RJN Exs. A-B. A lawsuit 
recently filed in Northern California details the work of such reputation 
management firms, which allegedly are suing pseudo-defendants to obtain 
stipulated judgments removing reviews and similar content from websites, 
then presenting those judgments to websites to demand that the content be 
removed. RJN Ex. C; see also RJN Exs. D-G (discussing similar actions 
across the country). Efforts to manipulate court systems and scrub critical 
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reviews from the Internet will thrive-in California in particular-if this 
Court approves the no-notice injunction entered against Yelp here. 
As this Court explained in Barrett, "[a]dopting a rule of liability 
under section 23 0 that diverges from the rule announced in Zeran and 
followed in all other jurisdictions would be an open invitation to forum 
shopping by defamation plaintiffs." 40 Ca1.4th at 58 & n.18 (citation 
omitted; emphasis added). Here too, this Court should adhere to the 
consistent interpretation of federal courts across the Nation, and broadly 
construe Section 230 to bar the injunctive relief against Yelp that was 
ordered here. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This Court's admonition a decade ago in Barrett applies just as 
forcefully now. "The Court of Appeal gave insufficient consideration to 
the burden its rule would impose on Internet speech. . .. Congress sought to 
'promote the continued development of the Internet and other interactive 
computer services"' by granting broad immunity to "Internet 
intermediaries" such as Yelp. 40 Ca1.4th at 56 (citations omitted). 
Ill 
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For all of the foregoing reasons, Yelp respectfully requests that the 
Court reverse the orders of the trial court and appellate court, and direct 
those courts to enter an order granting Yelp's Motion to Vacate the 
Judgment. 
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